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Abstract: This paper explores the intersection of national and transnational processes in shaping
Ireland's financial crisis. It uses insights from economic sociology to reconcile the anal}d;ical
tension hetween an understanding of Ireland's crisis in terms of the unfolding of an international
process and explanations that focus on specific national features. A series of significant policy
decisions in the late 1990s favoured financial markets in allocating capital and opened up
significant institutional space for speculative lending. Underneath the apparently consistent
expansion of the property lending buhble since the mid-1990s, there was a significant shift in
investment logics from the early 2000s as both residential and commercial real estate spending
became detached from underlying demand. This shift in logic was based on two significant
"translations" of investment rationalities into justifications of lending and investment that
underpinned the bubble. Irish banks' own conceptions of risk and rational investments shifted
subtly over time so that property lending was translated into a rational investment, encouraged
by market dynamics such as increased bank profits, rising share prices and concentration of
decision making power in the banking system. At the same time, and in the context of the
establishment of the euro, investing in the assets of Irish banks was translated into a rational
investment for international banks, in large part through the metrics of the credit ratings
agencies. The paper concludes by revisiting the question of how we should understand the
specifics of particular financial crises in conjunction with the general dynamics of financialisa-
tion - pointing to the importance of "translation" processes in creating social rationalities and the
significance of "market liberalism" as a social formation in enabling these translations and
promoting financialisation.
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I INTRODUCTION
Ireland's economic crisis is most fundamentally a financial crisis, originatingin a credit and asset bubble that toppled the hanking system and brought
with it fiscal, economic and social crisis. That crisis was not only huilt on a
credit bubble greater than in most other economies hut it reached further and
deeper into the Irish economy than elsewhere. The export boom of the 1990s
was damaged by the credit bubble which attracted financing that may well
have supported industrial development, shaped student decisions to move
towards qualifications that were rewarded in the property bubble, and inflated
the cost base. Even more significantly, the financial bubble was incorporated
into government finances and drove a fiscal crisis - first, through the
increasing reliance in the 2000s on "huhhle taxes" such as capital gains and
property sales taxes and, second, through taking the losses of hanks onto the
puhlic debt in 2008 and afterwards. Even as the crisis progressed, uncertainty
about the scale of Irish hank losses inflated Irish bond yields. The Irish
financial crisis was at the heart of the broader "five part crisis" (NESC, 2008)
of Irish economy and society.
On one reading, Ireland's financial crisis was a very local crisis. The sub-
prime mortgages and securitised mortgage products that were central to the
triggering of the US crisis were much less important in the Irish case, where
lending to developers and inflated property prices were much more significant
(Connor, Flavin and Kelly, 2010). While mortgage lending practices loosened
in the 2000s the crisis was not caused hy mortgage defaults (although these
became significant elements of the evolving crisis).
However, other features of the Irish crisis were shared more broadly. As
Connor, Flavin and Kelly (2010) point out, Ireland shared with the US
features such as "irrational exuberance" among market actors, a "capital
bonanza" (easy access to cheap capital for hanks - in the Irish case through
international borrowing), and failures of regulation and "moral hazard". In
addition, the various crises of the current period are linked through
increasingly close financial integration, with the US crisis in 2008 the tipping
point for Irish hanks' collapse as inter-bank liquidity dried up very rapidly.
This financial integration itself was closely linked to a broader project of
economic liberalisation in recent decades.
Ireland proved a world leader in the financialisation of the economy: "the
increasing role of financial motives, markets, actors and institutions in the
operation of the domestic and international economies" (Epstein, 2005, p. 3).
While there are many potential indicators of this process. Krippner (2011)
takes the share of profits within the economy going to financial activities as
her central measure of financialisation, arguing that this measure reflects
THE CRISIS OF FINANCIALISATION IN IRELAND 499
botb tbe sectoral growtb of finance and tbe accumulation of power within tbe
economy Figure 1 outlines trends in tbe profits of tbe "financial
intermediation" sector (banks and otber financial institutions, but not
including insurance, real estate and otber business services) for tbe years for
wbicb OECD statistics are available.
Figure 1: Proportion of all Corporate Profits (Gross Operating Surplus) Going
to the "Financial Intermediation' (Banking) Sector, 1988-2007
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Note: EU14 and the France and Germany measures are an average of national rates,
not a total of all profits across those countries.
Tbe statistics reveal some interesting variation in Irisb banking profits.
Despite tbeir lack of contribution to economic development (Honoban, 2006)
Irisb banks were comparatively profitable in tbe mid-1990s. Tbeir sbare of
corporate profits declined during tbe mid-1990s only to recover somewbat
alongside tbe export boom of tbe late 1990s. However, Irisb bank profits
surged dramatically from 2003 to 2007. Ireland's financial expansion was,
bowever, only one leg of a "triple financialisation", also including Anglo-
American financial systems and tbe financialisation associated witb European
integration and tbe euro in tbe 2000s. Wbile tbe US was always more
financialised tban tbe European core, tbat gap widened significantly over tbe
1990s, and financialisation is most closely associated witb "liberal market
economies" (Hall and Soskice, 2001) sucb as tbe US, UK and Ireland.
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However, tbe EU economies closed tbe gap somewbat firom 2001 onwards -
witb France and Germany sbowing a small surge in tbe 2002-2004 period
altbougb generally remaining significantly less financialised tban the liheral
economies. Analysis later in the paper shows tbat tbe German banking system
was bigbly segmented, witb internationalisation and trading of financial
instruments strongly concentrated among tbe commercial banking sector.
Since tbe proportion of Irisb banks' liabilities derived from foreign sources
grew dramatically in tbe 2000s (Lane, 2011), tbese were very significant
trends.
Tbe Irisb financial crisis has botb distinctive and more widely sbared
elements tberefore. It is botb a national and a trans-national pbenomenon.
Tbe division of responsibility for tbe crisis between national and international
factors is a matter of not only academic interest but profound disagreement
and controversy in sbaping policy responses, particularly in Europe. Tbis
paper explores tbis intersection of national and transnational processes in
sbaping Ireland's financial crisis. In order to do so, we seek to use insights
from economic sociology to reconcile tbe anal5d;ical tension between an
understanding of Ireland's crisis in terms of tbe unfolding of an international
process and explanations that focus on specific national features.
The following section outlines an analytical approach tbat seeks to
combine macro- and micro-sociological analyses of finance. In Section III we
review tbe basic parameters of tbe Irisb financial bubble and its apparently
steady growtb from tbe mid-1990s onwards. In tbis section I argue that a
series of significant policy decisions in the late 1990s weakened the capacity of
government to shape investment decisions and capital allocation. Given the
absence of a banking system tbat provided significant patient capital or
business lending, tbis opened up significant institutional space for more
speculative lending. Sections IV, V and VI examine the evolution of the process
of financialisation in Ireland and the formation of tbe credit bubble. First, tbe
paper argues tbat underneatb tbe apparently consistent expansion of tbe
property lending bubble since tbe mid-1990s tbere was a significant shift in
investment logics from tbe early 2000s as botb residential and commercial real
estate spending became detacbed from underlying demand. Second, tbe paper
tben examines bow tbis sbift in logic was based on two significant
"translations" of investment rationalities into justifications of lending and
investment tbat underpinned tbe bubble. Irisb banks' own conceptions of risk
and rational investments sbifted subtly over time so tbat property lending was
translated into a rational investment, encouraged by market dynamics sucb as
increased bank profits, rising share prices and concentration of decision
making power in tbe banking system. At tbe same time, and in tbe context of
the establisbment of tbe euro, investing in tbe assets of Irisb banks was
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translated into a rational investment for international banks, in large part
tbrougb tbe metrics of tbe credit ratings agencies. Section VII concludes by
revisiting tbe question of bow we sbould understand tbe specifics of particular
financial crises in conjunction with tbe general dynamics of financialisation -
pointing to tbe importance of "translation" processes in creating social
rationalities and the significance of "market liberalism" as a social formation
in enabling tbese translations and promoting financialisation.
11 UNDERSTANDING FINANCIALISATION
Connor et al. (2010) draw attention to tbe tension between universal and
specific features of financial crises. Tbey contrast Reinbart and Rogoff's (2011)
analysis of tbe universal features of financial crises witb their own focus on
the specific features of the Irish credit bubble, linked in particular to issues of
governance and national business culture. Tbese factors, tbey argue, are
intrinsically context-specific whereas the market dynamics that are the focus
of Reinhart and Rogoff's analysis are more generalisable. Market dynamics
operate at a universal level of analysis but are mediated by national
organisational and political cultures.
Tbere is a similar split in sociological analyses of finance in the macro-
economy and of social action by financial actors and in financial markets. Tbe
first strand tends to empbasise relatively consistent and widespread patterns
of tbe expansion (and contraction) of finance in tbe economy. For some,
bistorical surges in the importance of finance arise from the search of a
declining economic and political hegemonic power for new sources of wealth
and dominance (Arrighi and Silver, 2000). In the current era, the
financialisation of the US economy since the economic crises of the 1970s and
stagnant real incomes in the following decades is the classic case of such a
process (Krippner, 2011). For others, financialisation is linked to the
emergence of new technologies and, more broadly, new tecbno-economic
paradigms, as capital rushes to gain the exceptional returns from the
commericalisation of new technologies - most recently in the dot.com bubble
and bust of tbe late 1990s and early 2000s (Perez, 2002). Most generally,
Polanyi (1944) linked tbe rise of finance in tbe economy to a more general
process of tbe rise of market society, wbere markets came to dominate tbe
social structures within which they were embedded.
Wbile tbe macro-sociological literature on financialisation empbasises tbe
ebb and flow of finance over time, tbe second strand in social studies of finance
explores the micro-conditions or "social structures of finance" (McKenzie,
2006). While patterns of capital allocation are produced by many individual
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investment decisions, tbese decisions tbemselves prove to be rooted in broader
investment communities, witb shared notions of value, risk and rationality in
tbe market. Increasing attention is being paid to tbe dynamics of financial
markets, including research on behavioural finance in economics and in
sociology on bow participants in financial markets contest and dispute the
fairness and dependability of prices and the standardisation of financial
instruments (McKenzie, 2006, 2012). Tbese studies bave jdelded insigbt into
tbe cognitive and interactional foundations of financial markets, but have
relatively little to say about bow sucb markets vary from context to context, or
bow tbey connect to broader processes of financialisation.
How are tbese universal and specific features of crises linked? To
understand tbis we need to break down tbe separation between universal
market processes and context-speciflc social and political processes. Action in
financial markets is sbaped by tbe social and political contexts witbin wbicb
tbose markets are embedded. Wbere we observe broader patterns of tbe
expansion of finance in tbe economy tbis must be linked in turn to the
expansion of contexts that enhance tbe role of finance in economic life.
Particular social contexts create tbe conditions tbat make "financial action"
more likely. The specific forms tbis takes may vary even as the conditions for
the increased importance of finance spread. As tbese various forms of action
emerge and are institutionalised, togetber they form tbe macro-trends tbat
come to be seen as "financialisation".
Carruthers and Stincbcombe (1999) develop tbe useful concept of a "social
structure of liquidity^' as a way of understanding bow such processes of action
and interaction are linked to tbe social structures witbin wbicb tbey are
embedded. This is a bold attempt on tbeir part as they seek to show tbe
"embeddedness" of among tbe most marketised forms of economic organisa-
tion - bigbly liquid settings wbere assets can be disposed witbout significantly
transforming tbe structure of markets and pricing. Social structures of
liquidity consist of a set of actors including buyers, sellers and intermediaries
and, crucially, a set of instruments tbat actors agree are easily tradeable.
Carrutbers and Stincbcombe take as one of tbeir cases the very
securitisation of mortgages tbat later proved so central to tbe US financial
crisis. Theoretically, tbey emphasise the importance of liquidity as a problem
in the sociology of knowledge, where it is critical to explain bow market actors
come to bave a sbared belief in tbe reliability and value of tradeable assets -
wbetber tbose are mortgage backed securities, futures and options, sbares in
high-tech companies, commercial property development loans, or other assets.
Indeed, any kind of social action depends on an interpretation of future
conditions - and tbe possibility of tbis interpretation depends upon tbe future
being "solid enough" to permit a degree of planning and rationalist delibera-
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tion and decision making. For Stinchcombe, "... the social structures and
processes that make parts of the future solid enough to plan on are, ordinarily,
what we usually call institutions, and the process of creating solidity to the
future is what we usually call institutionalisation" (1997, p. 391).
The concept of "social structures of liquidity" deserves a fuller treatment
hut it directs our attention to a number of key points. First, any liquid asset
depends upon a shared set of definitions of value and tradeability, definitions
which are themselves somewhat illiquid in that they are rooted in specific
institutions, sets of buyers and sellers and national, occupational and other
cultures (McKenzie, 2012). Financialisation both transforms national
economies and business cultures, but also works through and is mediated hy
them. Second, as "liquid" finance seeks out investment opportunities it links
together multiple "social structures of liquidity - which may in turn compete,
interact and reinforce or undermine one other. Third, this linking process
involves important elements of "translation" of the var3dng definitions of what
are sensible investment opportunities - with the growth of institutions and
organisations whose function is largely to provide this translation, including
in particular the growth of "markets for governance" (Davis, 2011) and
certification, regulation and arhitration hy private agencies (Sassen, 2006).
The rest of this paper explores how such processes shaped financialisation in
the Irish context.
Ill IRELAND'S PROPERTY AND LENDING BUBBLE
As is well known, the djniamic of economic growth in Ireland shifted firmly
from an export-led expansion of employment and domestic demand in the
1990s to an economy fuelled hy domestic consumption and, particularly,
construction in the 2000s. Over the 2000s, the growth strategy increasingly
took the form of a "growth machine" where land-based elites "... profit through
the increasing intensification of the land use of the area in which its members
hold a common interest .... Governmental authority, at the local and nonlocal
levels, is utilised to assist in achieving this growth at the expense of competing
localities" (Molotch, 1976). The long-established connections between property
developers and political elites were significant in reinforcing this model of
growth. However, where past incarnations of the growth machine had relied
heavily on state funding (through social housing expansion in the 1930s and
through state office expansion in the 1970s), the property growth machine of
the 2000s was linked to a booming private market in residential and
commercial property.
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Ireland's boom in tbe 1990s almost inevitably included elements of
"overheating" and even "irrational exuberance". However, tbe damaging
effects of such tendencies were likely to be weakened as long as they were
balanced by tbe marsballing of newly available resources for productive
purposes. In tbe decade after tbe reduction of capital gains tax to 20 per cent
in 1998, these resources expanded as bank lending in tbe economy grew 466
per cent. However, tbe vast bulk of tbese monies went into tbe property sector
witb construction, real estate development and bousing finance accounting for
tbe vast bulk of the increase and of tbe total lending by 2007. Despite rapid
increases from a very low base, lending to R&D and computer services firms
remained a tiny proportion of overall lending and lending to bardware firms
declined, as did the industry. Construction and real estate lending increased
from 7 per cent to 28 per cent of total lending over tbe period (Figure 2). In
contrast, tbe bigb profile bigb-tecb sectors attracted less tban 2.5 per cent of
crediti (Ó Riain, 2009).
Figure 2: Percentage of Total Credit Going to Construction and Real Estate
Activities, 2000-2007
30%
25%
Note: These figures do not include personal mortgage lending.
Source: Central Bank of Ireland, multiple years. Sectoral Distribution of Credit.
' Data on lending from Central Bank of Ireland, multiple years. Sectoral Distribution of Credit.
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Figure 3 sbows in absolute terms how, altbougb non-construction
investment increased, tbe vast bulk of the capital available for investment in
tbe economy went into construction. Tbe growtb in construction investment
was large in tbe 1990s but further sped up in the 2000s. It may be of course
tbat tbe figure for productive investment is understated as "non-material"
investments become more important (e.g. R&D, marketing, and so on). Figure
4 provides some information on tbis, as well as a clearer picture of tbe relative
growtb of tbe different forms of investment. Non-building investment grows
substantially, and steadily until 2007. Tbe relative growtb of R&D spending of
Irisb-owned firms is also plotted in this grapb, as an indicator of tbe kinds of
productive investments made in non-material factors of production during tbis
time. For tbe years wbere data is available in a consistent series (1995-2005)
tbe R&D investment tracks tbe non-building investment trends very closely.
Construction investment of course increases mucb more quickly until 2006,
witb tbe same even more rapid increase from 2003 onwards sbowing up in tbe
data on relative growth rates. In short, while tbe construction boom began in
the 1990s, tbe dominance of construction over otber productive forms of
investment was dramatically consolidated in tbe 2000s.
Figure 3: Capital Availability and Investment, 1995-2010
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Source: CSO, National Income and Expenditure Annual Results 2011.
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Figure 4: Relative Growth of Different Forms of Capital Investment,
1995-2010
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Source: CSO, National Income and Expenditure Annual Results 2011; Forfás (multiple
years) R&D in the Business Sector.
Tbis bubble was rooted in cbanging national and investment politics.
Tbe Fianna Fail - Progressive Democrat coalition government elected in 1997
combined a longstanding "growtb macbine" approacb of tbe populist FF
dynasty witb the liberalising economic policies of tbe PDs. In tbe new
government's budget of 1998, capital gains tax was reduced from 40 per cent
to 20 per cent witb a view to releasing pent up capital into tbe economy. As we
bave seen, tbis goal was rapidly achieved - but tbat capital flowed primarily
and rapidly into property investment. It also sbifted the dynamics of
investment politics.
Transnational corporations have been tbe primary source of private sector
investment in Ireland. In addition to expanding production and employment,
many of tbem used Ireland as a centre for transfer pricing and related
financial activities. In many respects, tbis expansion in entrepôt activity in
Ireland was tbe equivalent of the financialisation of non-financial corporations
documented in the US by Krippner (2011, Cbapter 2). Nonetheless, this was a
negotiation with industrial capital whose dominance of investment in Ireland
favoured production, at least from the perspective of the domestic economy.
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In addition, tbe 1990s bad seen tbe expansion of the capacity of state
agencies in supporting and developing indigenous firms (Ó Riain, 2004; Girma
et al, 2008). Tbe most successful firms benefited as much from public
subsidies and supports as from private investor interest. Research into
software firms in Ireland sbows tbat a "developmental network state" boosted
economic performance as tbose firms tbat received tbe most state grant aid
exported more, employed more people and grew faster (Ó Riain, 2004). Tbese
positive effects of state aid bave also been found in manufacturing companies
in tbe 1990s (Girma et al, 2009) and tbe 1980s (O'Malley et al, 1992). Tbe
bulk of early financing of Irisb companies came through state-sponsored
investment schemes - it was only after growth was well underway in 1999
tbat private venture capital flooded into Ireland. In 1997, with the Celtic Tiger
already roaring, over a third of private equity investment came from state
sources and much of tbe private investment was stimulated by state
incentives for investors (Ó Riain, 2004).
More generally, stockbroker Rossa White (Wbite, 2010) bas documented
private sector failure to turn liquidity into investment in greater detail. He
finds tbat from 2000 to 2008 investment in bousing stock increased by 156 per
cent. Productive capital investment increased by 66 per cent, or €70 billion
However, of tbis €70 billion road building made up €13.5 billion, anotber €20
billion was invested in retail infrastructure (building sbops, etc.), public
buildings took up €9 billion and investment by semi-state companies and
energy/ utilities companies took up a further €10 billion. Ultimately, in an
era when bank lending increased by tbree to four times, inflation adjusted
productive capital stock spend by private enterprise increased by 26 per
cent between 2000 and 2008. Productive investment in Ireland has largely
been driven by foreign private capital and domestic public funding and
supports.
Tbe weak historical role of banking in Irisb development and tbe focus on
property lending went so deep tbat banks' organisational capacities to lend in
support of other sectors and, more generally, business development was weak.
As one fund manager told me, "Tbe skills of cash flow lending bave been lost
in Ireland, because people have been doing asset backed lending for so long".
Indeed, tbis was significant enougb tbat in late 2008 and 2009, tbe state
industrial development agency Enterprise Ireland sent some of its business
development officials to tbe major banks to advise tbem on commercial
lending and business development - transferring business lending and
development expertise from the public to tbe private sector (NESC, 2012).
However, tbe capacity for public action was weakened from the late 1990s.
ICC, a profitable state-owned industrial investment bank, was sold and
ultimately largely withdrew from business lending. Tbe number of state
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agencies involved in regulation grew rapidly during this period (Mac
Carthaigh, 2012). However, for all their activity these regulatory agencies
varied greatly in their power and effectiveness. While some agencies
dominated their constituencies others were less immune to "capture". The
Financial Regulator was designed as a relatively weak institution - in its
official powers, its range of action and its personnel. The Regling-Watson
report of 2010 details a series of additional failings in the regulatory system.
To add to the difficulties of regulation, the state dealt with both finance and
construction not only as regulator but also as promoter of industry growth.
The financial sector was a target of industrial development, identified as
a priority sector, with the main instrument for delivering this growth the
International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in Dublin. As one supporter
wrote in The Irish Times in 2006, "In the early days the value proposition for
the was simple: low corporation tax, a light touch regulatory regime - as little
red tape as possible - and an English speaking workforce located in the EU. It
was a value proposition that appealed to the international financial services
community as attested to by the rapid growth of the IFSC." Others viewed the
light regulation less henignly, describing the international reputation of the
IFSC as part of the "wild west" of financial (de)regulation (O'Brien, 2006).
With a weak regulator, little ability to steer long-term investment using taxes
and the removal or marginalisation of public agencies shaping capital
allocation, the field of domestic investment was ripe for banking dominance.
With little historical role in productive investment and business development,
a booming economy and a long standing property based "growth machine", the
hanking sector was never likely to resist investing in a property boom.
IV SHIFTING LOGICS WITHIN THE PROPERTY BOOM
Figure 5 indicates that house prices began to rise rapidly in 1994-1995 and
continued on a steep, almost linear trend until 2007. However, Whelan (2010)
suggests that Irish house prices could be explained by rising incomes
and changing demand linked to demographic and family change until at least
1997 - and possibly later if we take the low interest rates of the period into
account. By 2007, however, Irish houses were overvalued by at least 30 per
cent.
We can take a closer look at these shifting djoiamics by examining the link
hetween demand and supply in residential housing markets. Table 1 shows
the correlations hetween the vacancy rate in dwellings (excluding holiday
homes and uninhabitable buildings) at the time of the three censuses of the
period (1996, 2002, 2006) and the percentage increase in new housing stock in
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Figure 5: House Prices in the Irish State, 1982-2010
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Source: Department of the Environment, Housing Statistics.
tbe following tbree years (April 1996-December 1999, April 2002-December
2005, April 2006-December 2009) (see also Kitcbin et al, 2010). Since a bigb
vacancy rate implies a relatively low level of demand, we would expect tbat
bigb vacancy rates (low demand) are negatively correlated witb a bigb
percentage of new bousing stock (i.e. bigb supply). We are able to examine
tbese relations by using data on vacancy rates and bousing stock and
completions in tbe 34 local autbority areas in tbe state (including major urban
areas and tbe 26 county areas).
Table 1: Correlation Between Vacancy Rates and New Housing Stock in Local
Authority Areas, 1996-2009
Counties Included (N) 1996*1996-1999 2002*2002-2005 2006*2006-2009
All areas (34)
Non-USRS (29)
Urhan and Environs (15)*
Urban (8)**
-0.32
-0.23
-0.22
-0.03
0.14
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.36
-0.09
-0.41
-0.91
* City areas plus County areas attached to cities (e.g. Limerick County) and Wicklow,
Kildare and Meath (surrounding Dublin).
** City areas only.
Source: Data provided hy All-Ireland Research Observatory, NIRSA, NUI Maynooth.
Thanks to Rob Kitchin and Justin Gleason.
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Tbe top line provides tbe results for all areas. Tbe second line provides tbe
results for all counties except the five counties of the Upper Shannon Renewal
Scheme (USRS). This scheme started in 1998 and provided generous
incentives for investment in property in tbe declining rural counties of Cavan,
Leitrim, Longford, Roscommon and Sligo. These counties accounted for 5.1 per
cent of completions in 1996-1999, 7.2 per cent in 2002-2005, and 9.8 per cent
in 2006-2009. Tbe last two lines provide tbe results for the city areas and tbeir
contiguous counties, and finally for tbe city areas alone.
Care sbould be taken witb tbe small numbers of cases in some of tbe
categories but tbe results are nonetbeless interesting. A negative correlation
suggests tbat bigb vacancy rates depressed tbe increase in new bousing stock
in subsequent years - as common sense about demand and supply migbt
suggest. However, the data suggest that overall supply of housing became
increasingly delinked from demand, particularly between 2002 and 2005.
In tbe 1990s, bigb vacancy rates suppressed subsequent supply in most
areas, altbough tbe relationsbip is weakest in tbe urban areas. All areas break
tbe link witb demand in tbe early 2000s, altbougb tbe break is strongest in tbe
five USRS counties (as sbown in tbe gap between tbe correlation for all
counties and for tbe non-USRS counties). In tbe period from 2006 onwards,
supply in tbe USRS counties continue to go against demand, and rural areas
in general remain largely delinked from demand (see the difference between
non-USRS and Urban and Environs). Supply and demand are closely linked
once again in urban areas.
Overall, tbe data suggest tbat a boom in tbe 1990s was only detacbed from
demand in tbe urban areas, but tbat completions in tbe early 2000s were
increasingly detacbed from demand across tbe country. Tbis suggests a
broadening boom tbat was turning into a widespread bubble. Of all gbost
estates in 2010, 89 per cent (or those witb dates assigned to tbem in tbe
dataset) were granted planning permission in 2002-8 (based on analysis of
data data provided by All Ireland Research Observatory (AIRO). The volume
of transactions also increased during the 2000s (Figure 6), suggesting an
increasingly "liquidity" of housing as an asset.
In the later 2000s tbe residential bubble weakens significantly, except for
tbe tax incentive areas of the USRS. In tbe late 2000s, demand re-asserted
itself as a factor in developers' logics in urban areas. However, tbey appear to
bave continued to searcb for opportunities in rural areas (most clearly in tax
incentive areas but also mucb more broadly) even as developer bebaviour in
urban markets returned to some semblance of normality, albeit at bighly
infiated prices. Small local developers also appear to have helped drive tbis
continuing expansion of construction in rural areas as local builders were
tempted into moving into development.
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Figure 6: Volume of Transactions in the Housing Market (As Measured by
Loan Approvals) and Housing Stock - Growth Relative to 1991 Base Year
3.5 T
Housing Stock
Loans Approved
(Transactions)
-,—j—1^—^—J—¡—I—J—I
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
(e) (e)
Taken together, these patterns suggest that a housing boom turned into a
widespread bousing bubble that was then aggravated by tbe property based
tax incentives provided in certain areas. Tbis is reflected also in trends in tbe
granting of planning permissions tbat allow tbe construction of various
buildings (Figure 7). Residential planning permissions grew strongly from
2002 to 2005, as tbe correlational analysis suggested, but tben began to
decline witb an increase in extensions to existing bomes. Tbe residential
market then seemed to cool somewhat from the mid-2000s.
No such cooling took place for commercial development with planning
permissions increasing rapidly until 2007. Whereas residential planning
permissions in 2007 were 17 per cent higher than 2001, commercial planning
permissions were 132 per cent higher. Figure 8 traces the evolution of the
office construction market in Dublin from 1991 to 2011, the largest market
for non-residential development.2 The market shifted significantly over
these decades in a number of significant ways - including massive expansion
and suburbanisation (McLaran, 2012). However, our focus is once more on tbe
link between demand and supply and tbe sbifting logics of developers over
time.
2 The data were kindly provided by Andrew MacLaran, TCD. There is an analysis of broader
trends in Dublin commercial real estate in MacLaran et al. (2012).
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Figure 8 sbows tbe percentage of office space in any given year tbat was
newly added since the previous year. It shows that between 1995 and 2001
there were significant increases in tbe proportion of new office space added
each year, reaching a peak of 12.6 per cent in 2001. The rate of increase
dropped rapidly in tbe downturn of the following two years but tben increased
again to remain between 5 and 6 per cent between 2006 and 2009. This
suggests tbat a major bubble in tbe late 1990s was followed by a smaller
bubble in tbe mid- to late-2000s.
However, a closer look at tbe underlying logic of demand and supply across
tbe period reveals a quite different picture. As in residential construction, we
can track bow closely vacancy rates affected office space supply (i.e. bow
responsive developers were to demand) by looking at tbe relationship between
office vacancy rates in a given year (demand) and the percentage of new office
space in tbe following year (supply). Figure 9 plots the percentage of new
bousing stock in a given year on tbe y-axis, witb tbe vacancy rate in tbe
previous year on tbe x-axis.
In the early 1990s, tbe market was stagnant with vacancy rates around 10
per cent, but growth tbrougb tbe 1990s soon took off- witb tbe percentage of
new office space climbing steadily eacb year. What is striking, bowever, is tbat
vacancy rates fell during the same period as underlying demand was strong.
A sudden spike in development in 2000-2001, combined witb a stuttering
economy, lead tbe vacancy rate to spike and tbis increase in vacancy rates
continued as tbe economy struggled from 2001 to 2003. However, it is striking
tbat, after a spike in tbe area available for rent in 2001, tbe rate of supply of
new office space reduced rapidly. However, from 2004 to 2008 tbe supply of
office space increased again to an additional 5-6 per cent per year. At a time
wben tbere was a great deal of office space vacant in Dublin, development
activity continued at a level tbat maintained and even increased those
vacancy rates.
Tbe time borizons of property deals were sbortened as developers at tbe
height of the boom were building housing estates tbat bad already been sold
off tbe plans, or wbere urban renewal and other development tax incentives
had greatly reduced tbe financial risks involved. Tbe practice of "flipping"
properties - building properties tbat were sold to investors for more or less
immediate resale to other buyers became quite widespread (Kelly, 2010;
MacDonald and Sberidan, 2009). In addition, first person accounts suggest
that developers were increasingly tied into the bubble tbrougb interlocking
deals and interests, making it difficult for tbem to exit tbe complex network of
contracts that sustained tbe bigbly leveraged market (Kelly, 2010). A wbole
range of actors were tied into tbe dynamics of the bubble tbrougb booming
land values, bousing and office space prices and rent, and property flipping
(Kitchin eioZ., 2010).
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Figure 7: Rate of Change of Planning Permissions Granted 2001-2010
(2001=100)
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Source: Department of the Environment, Housing Statistics.
Figure 8: Percentage of Office Space Added in the Previous Year, Greater
Dublin Area, 1991-2011
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Source: Data generously provided by Andrew MacLaran, TCD. Further details in
MacLaran et al. (2012).
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Figvire 9: Office Space Vacancy Rate and New Housing Stock in Subsequent
Year, Dublin 1991-2011
12.00%
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
2.00%
1999
1998
\ 2006 __ 2005
1996
1995
4.00% 2Ö02 2004"
1994.1992
.^2010
0.00%-
0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00
Source: Data provided by Andrew MacLaran, TCD. Further details in MacLaran et al.
(2012).
In sbort, tbe property market moved from a bighly liquid market in
property development assets to a market in real estate development liquidity
itself - in tbe "flipping" of deals witb relatively low levels of uncertainty over
sbort periods of time. However, tbese sbort-term "solid futures" were
increasingly built, as we soon discovered, on futures tbat were remarkably
fragile in tbe medium to long term. Wbile residential markets bad begun to
adjust somewbat before tbe downturn of 2007 and tbe crisis of 2008, tbe
commercial market and tbe key firms witbin it continued to inflate tbe
property bubble until tbe crisis bit.
Finally, we can tum to credit itself. Here again, it is instructive to examine
tbe broadly linear pattern of increase in credit outlined in Figure 2 in more
detail. Figure 10 indicates trends in tbe speed at wbicb tbe volume of credit
increased in tbe economy, measured on a quarterly basis (and reported as tbe
average of tbe previous 3 quarters' increase). It sbows tbat tbe rate of increase
of credit provided for construction and real estate activities ran abead of all
otber sectors at all times from 2000 to 2007. Across tbe middle of tbe boom, tbe
rate of increase in development credit and all otber credit went broadly in tbe
same direction. However, tbere are also interesting variations. In the period
from early 2002 to mid-2003 (tbe bursting of tbe dot-com bubble) credit to non-
development sectors grew slowly and barely at all in the first half of 2003.
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However, real estate development credit grew rapidly. Again in 2005-2006,
property and construction related credit in tbe economy grew increasingly
rapidly even as tbe rest of tbe economy saw a slowing of credit growth.
Figure 10: Quarterly Percentage Increase of Credit to (a) Construction and
Real Estate Activities (b) All Other Sectors (3 Quarter Moving Average of
Quarterly Increases)
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Source: Central Bank of Ireland, multiple years. Sectoral Distribution of Credit.
The origins of the property and credit bubbles lie in tbe late 1990s, when
economic growth was driven primarily by exports and by an increase in
domestic demand (including, but not limited to, bousing). Construction and
real estate investment and lending grew faster tban tbe rest of tbe economy,
even during tbis period. However, during tbis period investment in botb
bousing and commercial real estate largely tracked tbe increasing demand
and declined in 2002-2003 as tbe economy slowed. However, from tbat period
on, wbile tbe rest of tbe economy was mucb slower to recover, property lending
and investment expanded very rapidly and became increasingly detacbed from
demand. Buyers and sellers chased the market in an increasing volume of
sales wbile credit grew rapidly - most of tbe long-term damage to tbe economy
was done in a relatively sbort number of years between 2002 and 2008, even
if tbe conditions for a bubble have been put in place before tbe 2000s.
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V TRANSLATION OVER TIME: PROPERTY LENDING BECOMES
MORE RATIONAL
How did tbe developers and banks themselves make sense of this bubble ?
Looking at tbe construction sector, tbe press releases from four major
companies identify almost no risks until 2008. Mclnerney, a major residential
builder, suggested in 2005 tbat "Strong market demand for Irish housing
shows no sign of diminishing. It is expected tbat this demand will continue,
boosted by employment, demograpbics and inward migration. We remain well
positioned to capitalise on tbese trends". Treasury Holdings reported from
their 2007 annual conference that "... the sun is not ready to set on Ireland's
rapidly growing global property empire".
While there was some recognition of slowing growth and market pressures
in late 2007 and 2008, these risks were discounted based on "... a very strong
indigenous economy and a strengtbening international environment"
(Treasury, 2007); "ongoing strengtb in the non-residential construction
market" (Kingspan, 2008) and a "... resilient income producing portfolio and
its well timed long-term development pipeline" (Shelbourne, 2008). Mclnerney
observed in 2007 tbat "... the fundamentals of the Irish economy and housing
market remain strong although consumer caution became more evident as tbe
period progressed, impacted by tbe tigbtening of interest rates".
Banks' optimistic assessments of asset quality, capital position and
economic growth also evolved over time - becoming more confident even as tbe
conditions of the banking boom became less sustainable. Here it is instructive
to examine tbe annual reports of tbe banks and tbe risks and mitigating
factors they identify in their Chairman's and introductory statements.
Table 2 classifies the major business issues mentioned in tbe opening
statements of tbe annual reports of tbe tbree major banks from 2000 to 2007.
Altbough there are broad similarities between tbe banks, tbere are also
interesting differences. The retail focus of the Bank of Ireland is evident in its
focus on operational efficiencies and weak focus on capital and risk
management. What is not clear from the table is the lack of detailed content
in the reports of Anglo Irish Bank and the general and formulaic character of
many of the statements. The issues raised are considered in more detail in the
reports of the other two banks.
In a 2006 issue of About Banking, tbe journal of the Irish Banking
Federation, two solicitors argued that Ireland needed to prepare for the end of
the bubble by securitising more asset classes so it was poised to take
advantage of the recovery. Similar articles in trade magazines and the
national press also interpreted the crisis in terms of the US difficulties with
subprime mortgages and securitisation and minimised tbe possibilities of
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Table 2: Key Business Issues - Years Mentioned in Bank Annual Report
Opening Statements, 2000-2007 (8 years)
Risk Capital Asset Operational Market
Management Position Quality Efficiencies Position
Anglo 3 3 5 Q, 2
AIB 6 4 5 4 4
BOI 2 1 6 6 2
contagion from tbe US and tbe importance of commercial ratber tban
residential property lending to Irisb banks.
Tbe first element is tbe concept of economic or market fundamentals -
underlying aspects of the economy whicb allow tbe discounting of specific or
localised risks. Tbis concept extended across a range of institutional actors,
often used in quite similar ways. Tbis allowed tbe discounting of warning
signs in the economy tbrougb tbe bubble period:
• "Economic fundamentals remain firm - demographics, job creation,
income growtb and the government's fiscal position all remain positive
while tbe interest rate outlook is now more supportive. These
fundamentals support ongoing demand for housing, although below
the exceptional levels seen in recent years. Buyer and seller
expectations are realigning and prices are likely to settle witb a
measured reduction in supply. This will support a more stable bouse
price environment, important to tbe long-term growtb and
competitiveness of tbe Irisb economy" (Anglo Annual Report, 2007).
• "While short-term economic prospects for AIB's main markets are
somewbat mixed, tbe medium term outlook is more positive. Irisb
GDP is forecast to slow to 2.5 per cent tbis year, reflecting tbe
slowdown in the bousing sector and a weaker global economy.
However, economic fundamentals remain solid and growtb is expected
to pick up again in 2009 and beyond." (AIB Annual Report, 2007.)
A second dimension is the reliance on the self-correcting properties of
tbe market, obviating tbe need for extensive political management of economic
tensions:
• "After a decade of such strong price growth it was always inevitable
tbat tbe market would peak and tbat prices migbt start to come back
at some stage" (About Banking, 2007).
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• "New Dublin office supply in the next two years will be very modest as
output has heen reduced significantly in the last 12 months, helping
the market move towards equilibrium .... House prices have been
falling in Ireland now for 19 months, longer than in many other
countries, and this, combined with falls in interest rates, means that
Irish housing is now significantly more affordahle than it has been for
some years and in 2009 is expected to drop to 1997 affordability levels.
(Source: AIB Economic Research)." (Treasury, 2008).
• "The set of circumstances that could result in a sudden sharp
correction to the market are not in place and it is unlikely that they
would come into place for the forecastable futvire" (Friends First,
2006).
These came together in the varying trends in each bank's assessment of
the macroeconomic environment. This proved crucial as many of the positive
assessments of banks' asset quality and of sectoral trends are justified in
terms of their underlying value and the percentage of performing loans -
factors that were increasingly dependent upon, and justified by, ongoing
economic growth. For example, the Danske bank chief argued in About
Banking in 2006 that Ireland did not have a bubble because of the presence of
low interest rates, financial innovation and liheralisation that was still
reducing the cost of borrowing, and the trend towards urhanisation driving
high end demand as elites desired city centre living.
Table 3 examines trends in macroeconomic assessments more formally.
Anglo Irish Bank's reports indicate some concerns in 2000 hut throughout the
2000s are almost exclusively positive in their assessment - and particularly
at the height of the huhble in 2005-2007. By contrast, in the uncertain years
of 2001-2003 AIB's evaluations were negative while Bank of Ireland's were
mixed. However, these concerns disappeared at the height of the hoom with all
three banks offering uniformly positive assessments. As the bubble grew, the
hanks that had expressed concerns in the earlier years converged on Anglo's
lack of concern about the hubble.
Competition between the banks appears to have been a factor in "crowding
in" the two leading banks, AIB and Bank of Ireland, into property lending.
Figure 11 shows trends in profits among the "Big 3" hanks in Ireland and the
surge in Anglo's profits, to the point where it had significantly closed the gap
with Bank of Ireland by 2007. Executive compensation followed suit -
including, as became apparent in 2008, secret loans to executives and directors
of as much as €70 million. AIB in particular responded with a shift into real
estate and development lending, with a corresponding surge in profits and
suhsequent collapse.
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Table 3: Assessments of Macroeconomic Environment - Positive and
Negative Mentions in Bank Annual Report Opening Statements, 2000-2007
(8 years)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Anglo
Positive X X X X X
Negative X
AIB
Positive X X X
Negative X X X X
BOI
Positive X X X X XX
Negative X X X
3,000
2,500
2,000
§ 1,500
Ü 1,000
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Figure 11: Bank Profits, 2000-2008
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Year
—•-»Anglo •AIB BOI
Source: Annual Reports.
If market competition could not provide tbe discipline required, perbaps
managerial autbority could. In practice, bowever, tbe centralisation of
executive autbority in the banks furtber reinforced tbe convergence of
optimistic assessments of asset quality, capital position and economic growtb.
Bank executives faced few cballenges to tbeir perspectives. Autbority witbin
tbe banks was bigbly centralised, as tbe Anglo report of 2006 notes: "Tbe
Bank's centralised business model enables quick decision making, ensuring
consistent delivery of service to our customers and effective management of
risk. It also allows us to operate in an efficient and streamlined manner, as
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reflected by our cost to income ratio of 27 per cent". Senior bank executive
salaries rose rapidly in all banks through the 2000s, with bonuses that were
in practice increased by corporate strategies that inflated the bubble (TASC,
2010).
Furtbermore, bank executives, and especially key figures like Sean
Fitzpatrick at Anglo and Laurence Crowley at AIB, were at the very centre of
interlocking directorates in the Irisb business world. Cement Roadstone bad a
Director on eacb of the banks' boards wbile Anglo bad directors from
Mclnerney and Dublin Docklands Development Autbority, Bank of Ireland
from the DDDA, and Irish Life and Permanent from Kingspan and the
Grafton Group. In general, tbe most intensively networked executives were
bank executives or property investors and developers (TASC, 2010, p. 10,
Table 3). Internal centralisation of autbority and close external networking of
executives are likely to bave minimised tbe opportunities for alternative
perspectives to establisb tbemselves and to bave reinforced tbe property based
social structure of liquidity. Relatively autonomous managers failed to provide
tbe organisational mecbanisms to ensure financial prudence.
Sbarebolders were tbe otber candidates for providing sufficient external
oversigbt from witbin tbe private sector as a "market for governance" (Davis,
2011). However, tbe stock market itself reinforced tbe tendencies towards
financialisation. Figure 12 sbows tbe progress of a variety of Irisb Stock
Market Indices from 1995 to 2005. Tbe General Index sbowed strong growtb
in tbe late 1990s but dipped from 2001 to 2003 and only recovered by 2005.
Figure 12: Irish Stock Market Indices, 1995-2005
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However, tbe financial stocks surged from 2000 onwards, after strong growtb
in tbe 1990s. Tbe stock market was also a weak mecbanism for distributing
investment to tbe productive and innovative, ratber tban speculative, sectors.
The technology-based index never recovered subsequent to tbe dot-com bubble
bursting in 2001 wbile tbe financial stocks increased rapidly in value. Tbe
stock market rewarded tbe lending patterns that were summarised at the
outset of this chapter.
VI TRANSLATION OVER SPACE: LENDING TO IRISH BANKS
BECOMES MORE RATIONAL
So far, our analysis has focused on domestic processes. However, a crucial
element in the transformation of this property-based growth machine into an
engine of national crisis was rapid increases in international lending to Irish
banks tbrougb tbe 2000s. Tbis facilitated tbe increase in the scale of activity
through the 2000s that turned bank debt into a national catastropbe in 2008.
Wbile in 2003, 20 per cent of Irisb banks' net liabilities were owed to
international lenders, this rose to almost 80 per cent by early 2008 (Lane,
2011). Around one-tbird of Irisb banks' international liabilities were in tbe
eurozone, bovering above tbat from 2003 to 2006 and tben trending sligbtly
more towards the rest of the world - the US and particularly the UK - from
2006 until 2009. The bubble in property and finance in Ireland was primarily
funded tbrougb UK, US and European lenders. Access to international lending
broke any automatic limits that a national economy might place on credit
bubbles witbin its own borders. Tbe social structure of liquidity tbat
underpinned the asset bubble was not only local but also transnational.
Tbe Irish financial crisis was intertwined with this international
flnancialisation and particularly with the increasing international reach of
French and German banks in international financial markets. Figures 13 and
14 sbow tbat wbile domestic credit expanded in the French and German
economies over the past two decades, it is the growth in international lending
by domestic banks tbat is tbe most striking cbange in eacb financial system.
In addition, wbile the changes in domestic credit vary between the two
countries, the trends in international lending are strikingly similar. The
loosening of credit in the German domestic economy was greatest in the 1990s,
with recovery after unification, but slowed in tbe 2000s. In France, by
contrast, tbe growth in domestic credit was in the 2000s and tracked the
growth in international lending at the time. International lending by botb
financial systems went from below 40 per cent of GDP in 1990 to around 160
per cent at tbe peak of tbe 2000s credit boom. Together these represented a
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Figure 13: Domestic Credit in the French Economy and International
Lending by French Banks, 1990-2010 (Percentage of GDP)
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Figure 14: Domestic Credit in the German Economy and International
Lending by German Banks, 1990-2010 (Percentage of GDP)
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massive expansion of credit - and an expansion that was concentrated
increasingly in international operations.
Where did the international lending of French and German banks go?
Table 4 shows the location of the foreign claims of banks from France,
Germany, the UK and the US. The Irish statistics are provided for indicative
purposes only as they include both lending to domestic banks and to the IFSC.
These statistics only begin in the first quarter of 2005, understating the surge
in international lending that began in earnest in the 1990s and grew
dramatically from 2003/2004. The growth in international lending is much
broader than the interaction with the European periphery, even though for
German and French banks the SPIIG countries figure more prominently over
time. Nonetheless, even among lending into SPIIG countries accounts for one-
quarter of German and just under a quarter of French international lending
at the peak of the credit hoom. The international lending boom found an outlet
in the European periphery (Figure 15), but it was not driven by developments
in peripheral countries but by broader dynamics of financialisation.
Table 4: Foreign Claims of Domestically Owned Banks, 2005-2008:
Proportion of Foreign Claims in European Periphery of German, French, UK
and US Banks
Germany France UK US
% % % %
Total Increase in 35.0 127.1 79.9 63.3
International Lending
2005-2008
2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008
QI Q3 QI Q3 QI Q3 QI Q3
Ireland
Spain
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Total SPIIG
3.3
4.0
1.3
5.8
1.0
15.3
5.4
6.7
1.0
5.6
1.1
19.8
1.7
4.5
1.2
7.6
0.9
15.9
2.5
4.9
2.3
12.8
0.9
23.4
4.2
3.0
0.4
2.8
0.6
11.0
4.6
3.1
0.3
2.0
0.6
10.6
1.0
2.2
0.8
3.7
0.3
8.0
2.4
1.9
0.5
1.6
0.2
6.6
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, Table 9.
Note: The Irish statistics are provided for indicative purposes only as they include both
lending to domestic banks and to the IFSC.
Not surprisingly, this overall increase in lending contrihuted substantially
to a credit boom in the SPIIG countries in the 2000s. By 2007 domestic credit
in these two economies was at 200 per cent of GDP, while it was 125 per cent
of German and French GDP.
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Figure 15: Domestic Credit in the European Periphery (Percentage of GDP)
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Ireland's story is a particularly dramatic national pattern of credit
expansion, but tbis is embedded in a broader transformation in financial
systems in tbe European core and peripbery. Tbe question tben becomes bow
it was possible tbat tbe banking systems of core and peripbery could become
so enmesbed given bistorically weak relations and the apparent bubble
cbaracter of tbeir property booms in tbe 2000s.
A crucial role bere was played by tbe credit rating agencies, private
regulatory organisational forms tbat provide ratings of tbe quality of a wide
variety of financial instruments, linked botb to private and sovereign issuers.
Tbey offer a market in regulatory monitoring. Tbey bave also become crucial
in creating the informational basis for markets in financial products and
assets. Tbe ratings provided by agencies are in many cases what is effectively
being traded as tbe cbaracter of tbe underlying asset is of less value tban tbe
re-sale value of tbe asset and tbe possibility of re-packaging and/or
securitising it (or part of it).
International lenders did not lend into specific loans or business
development projects provided by Irisb banks. Instead tbe funds were raised
tbrougb various offerings of bonds, commercial paper and otber instruments
associated witb tbe banks (Killian et al., 2011, Appendix 4). Investors' decision
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to invest in tbese instruments depended beavily on tbe rating of tbe funds and
tbe banks. Altbougb credit rating reports are largely proprietary, tbe press
releases of Moodys ratings agency are publicly available on tbe corporate
website. It is possible to obtain from these releases tbe major cbanges in Anglo
Irisb Bank's credit rating from 1998 to 2008 and to analyse tbe summary
comments provided by Moodys, outlining the reasons for ratings changes (see
Table 5).
Table 5: Moody's Credit Rating Changes and Summary Comments Regarding
Anglo Irish Bank, 1998-2008
Date Long Term
Deposit Rating
(LTD)
Financial
Strength (FS)
Comment
Various, Baal (LTD) "In the context of 20 per cent banking growth rates in
1998-2001 DH- (FS) 1997/98, which is not sustainable longer term, a key
challenge will be to preserve acceptable asset-quality
Increase to: indicators".
A3 "The rating agency added that asset quality remained
C sound and that profitability has been reasonable,
constrained in part by the costs associated with the
bank's acquisitions."
"Anglo-Irish's credit quality is constrained by its
reliance on middle market corporate lending.
Furthermore, the bank is reliant on market funding
and has a limited retail deposit base."
"Moody's has maintained a stable outlook on First
Active's ratings, noting that the bank's financial
condition was sound, even after the effects of margin
compression, and that the mortgage and savings
business offers predictable earnings with a lower risk
of credit losses than many other sectors".
"Moody's added that the bank's profitabihty could be
affected by an economic slowdown in Ireland but the
agency sees this risk as manageable, short of a less
likely 'hard landing'".
"Moody's added that the bank's profitability could be
affected by an economic slowdown in Ireland".
2002 ~-
2003 Change from
stable to positive
outlook
"Loan-loss provisions are likely to increase in 2003,
but underlying asset quality remains sound".
"Liquidity levels in the sector are good (underpinned
by Central Bank requirements)".
"Moody's .said the nhangfi.s in the rating outlook
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Table 5: Moody's Credit Rating Changes and Summary Comments regarding
Anglo Irish Bank, 1998-2008 (Contd.)
Date Long Term
Deposit Rating
(LTD)
Financial
Strength (FS)
Comment
reflected the continuing progress Anglo Irish has
made in strengthening its funding profile despite
strong lending growth, whilst maintaining the quality
of the loan book".
"although the ratings agency expects that the
weakening of property markets in the UK and Ireland
will put pressure on profitability going forwards".
"Moody's notes that Irish banks have limited exposure
to troubled sectors overseas such as high-tech,
télécoms and aviation".
2004
C+
A2 "The upgrade takes account of the AIBC's on-going
success in maintaining and indeed growing its
position within the highly competitive Irish and UK
commercial property lending markets. Importantly
this growth has not been at the expense of asset
quality which remains good, built as it is on precise
underwriting standards. In particular we note that
AIBC's lending for investment property lending is on
pre-let properties and that its exposure to larger high
profile properties is limited. Further most loans are
secured on a portfolio of property cashflows".
2007 A l
C-t-
Re UK Covered bonds new issuance:
"The Cover Pool comprises a relatively concentrated
pool of commercial mortgage loans. In particular, the
borrower and property diversity is lower than for
other Cover Pools. Moreover, properties securing the
Mortgage Loans comprise of a significant portion of
specialty and operating assets. These assets bear a
relatively high operational risk resulting in relatively
challenging servicing, especially in case of a Mortgage
Loan's adverse performance or default. Moody's has
taken property quality, property diversity and
borrower diversity into account when determining the
required over-collateralisation".
"The A2/P-1/CH- ratings of AIBC reflect the bank's
stable market position and proven strategy as a
secured lender to medium-sized corporates,
professional property investors and high net worth
individuals. The ratings also take into consideration
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Table 5: Moody's Credit Rating Changes and Summary Comments regarding
Anglo Irish Bank, 1998-2008 (Contd.)
Date Long Term
Deposit Rating
(LTD)
Financial
Strength (FS)
Comment
AIBC's sound profitability, good credit quality and
rigorous lending approach. AIBC is somewhat reliant
on short-term wholesale funding, mitigated by the
ongoing diversification of funding sources and by the
institution's successful deposit-gathering strategy.
Moody's noted that, whilst the issuance of extendible
notes provided a further degree of diversification to
the group's funding base, it nevertheless regards the
instruments as a less robust form of long-term
funding given their 13 month tenure".
2008 (pre- Al
guarantee)
Comments on rating of covered bonds issuance as Aaa
"The Covered Bond investors benefit from
1) The credit strength of the Issuer, rated Al/Prime-1.
2) A pool of assets securing the Issuer's payment
obligations under the terms of the Covered Bonds
(the "Cover Pool"). The Cover Pool comprises of UK
commercial mortgage loans that have been
originated hy the Issuer and has a weighted
average LTV of approximately 75 per cent.
3) Securitisation style techniques designed to i)
mitigate the risk associated with the possible
deterioration of the credit profile of the Cover Pool;
ii) ring fence the Cover Pool in the event of the
insolvency of the Issuer; iii) mitigate the risks
associated with the credit deterioration of the swap
counterparties and of the Cover Pool; and iv)
mitigate refinancing risk, through the extension
features contemplated in the terms and conditions
of the Covered Bonds.
As is the case with other covered bonds, Moody's
considers the credit strength of the transaction to be
linked to that of certain parties, mainly the Issuer in
particular from a timeliness of payment perspective.
Should such credit strength deteriorate, all other
things being equal, the rating of the Covered Bonds
may be expected to come under negative pressure.
However, the Issuer has the ability, hut not the
obligation, to increase the over-collateralisation of the
transaction in order to reduce the linkage to the credit
strength of the Issuer".
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Anglo's credit rating climbs steadily through a period when the hubble was
growing and then inflating rapidly. The comments in the years to 2003 exhibit
a degree of caution that largely disappears in the later bubble years. In
addition, the reasons for raising the credit rating are specifically those issues
that came to be the downfall of Anglo - asset quality, poor underwriting and
operations, cashflows from bubble operations, and securitisation. Not
surprisingly, this gave reassurance to Anglo itself. They comment regarding
similar upgrades by Fitch: "We are delighted that the Bank received yet
another upgrade of its credit ratings, most recently in February this year by
Fitch Ratings, the international rating agency. The Bank's long and short term
ratings now stand at A and Fl respectively. This provides further evidence of
the Bank's underlying strength and follows the upgrade last year by the
international ratings agency Moody's, of the Bank's long-term deposit credit
rating" (Annual Report, 2002).
Rather than monitoring the market, the rating agencies were firmly
embedded within the rationalities of the property and credit bubble - in the
process reproducing and deepening it. In the process, they "translated" the
Irish banks' activities into a homogenised metric of asset quality that enabled
international funders to purchase bonds issued by Irish banks. The agencies
played a critical role in translating the specificities of the Irish social structure
of liquidity around property into a set of defined, standardised instruments
that could he traded alongside other instruments from other social structures
of liquidity around the world.
It is worth noting briefly here that access to international funding was
shaped by Ireland's integration into economies that were themselves
financialising in distinctive ways. In particular, European hanks had departed
from their previous close ties to industrial firms, where German banks in
particular served as "hausbanks" for leading industrial firms, providing long
term "patient capital". Beyer and Hopner (2003) argue that the German model
of corporate governance underwent very significant changes during the 1990s,
as a variety of diverse small changes from the mid-1980s onwards coalesced
into a significantly transformed overall regime hy the late 1990s. These
resulted in "... the increasing shareholder orientation of companies; the
strategic reorientation of the big banks from the Hausbank paradigm to
investment banking that resulted in a loosening or abandoning of ties with
industrial companies; the withdrawal of the state from infrastructural sectors
via privatisation; and the break of continuity in German company regulation
that supported and accelerated shareholder orientation and network
dissolution" (2003, p. 180).
As indicated in Figure 1 above, these banks watched US financial
institutions' profits race ahead of their own through the 1990s. In the 2000s,
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European banks involved tbemselves mucb more deeply in international
financial markets. Between 2001 and 2008, tbe sbare of Deutscbe Bank's
assets tbat were international increased from 66 per cent to 82 per cent
(Annual Reports). Tbis was linked also to securitisation as IMF figures show
a dramatic increase in German banks' use of securitisation, witb issuance in
2006 tbat was over six times greater tban levels in 2004 (IMF, 2009, p. 13).
Tbe ability to purcbase "notes" issued by Irisb banks, witb bigb credit ratings
attacbed, was attractive to European banks wbicb were seeking assets that
could be components in tbeir own securitised financial instruments. Tbe
bubble in German banking may have been sborter and less dramatic tban in
tbe liberal economies. It was also concentrated among tbe commercial banks,
witb significant elements of tbe banking system - including tbe savings and
state banks - remaining largely outside tbe bubble and continuing to lend to
small businesses before and tbrougb tbe crisis (Federation of Small
Businesses, 2012, p. 12). Nonetbeless, German financialisation became
enormously consequential for countries like Ireland. Tbe triangle of Irisb
banks, international funders and credit ratings agencies connected tbe Irisb
social structure of liquidity based on personalised property development
lending to tbe international trade in securitised financial instruments tbrougb
tbe standardising effects of credit ratings. In tbe process, it weakened tbe ties
between financial and industrial capital in botb tbe European peripbery and
tbe core.
VII CONCLUSION
Tbe excessive and foolbardy lending to tbe property development sector in
Ireland was produced by a number of social and institutional sbifts. Tbe
property-based "growtb macbine", linking developers and political elites,
especially in Fianna Fail, bas long been a feature of Irisb society. However, it
could only become tbe force tbat derailed tbe national economy tbrougb tbree
crucial steps.
First, it sidelined alternative "social structures of liquidity" - most
notably, tbe export oriented industries tbat bad been tbe primary drivers of
economic development in tbe 1990s. Tbese sectors were dominated by foreign
investment but were also sbaped by public agencies supporting tbe
development of indigenous firms (Ó Riain, 2004). Private banks were notably
absent from tbe process of indigenous industrial and business development.
Wben capital gains tax was cut and financial regulation weakened in tbe late
1990s, private capital was given tbe institutional power to decide tbe
destination of investment and favoured property over tecbnology (or indeed
otber potential productive industries, sucb as food).
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Second, the banking sector itself came to see property lending as a rational
investment strategy, despite warnings regarding tbe risks of a bubble. More
specifically, tbe banking sector promoted property even after tbe slowdown in
growth in the 2002-2003 period and as property development hecame detacbed
from demand. Justifications for tbis support relied beavily on notions of strong
economic fundamentals and self-correcting markets. Competition between
banks "crowded in" tbe banks wbo were late to property lending into an
entbusiastic pursuit of tbe profits enjoyed by Anglo Irish Bank and others.
Neither managerial autbority nor markets for governance tbrougb the stock
market provided the necessary check on this risky activity. Instead, property
lending was translated over time into a rational investment.
Third, the expansion of this activity to a scale that was disastrous in terms
of the national economy was dependent on tbe willingness of international
lenders to fund Irisb banks. Tbis occurred most dramatically between 2002
and 2007 and was encouraged by tbe liberalisation and internationalisation of
significant sections of German and Frencb banking and tbe financial
integration associated with the euro. However, the specific ties between
international and Irisb banking were made possible by tbe translation over
space of Irisb lending into an internationally tradeable asset tbrougb tbe work
of credit rating agencies.
These steps together linked the general process of financialisation and tbe
specific features tbat cbaracterised it in Ireland. Tbe existence of a broader
process of financialisation facilitated its expansion in Ireland. However, tbat
broader process itself is constituted out of tbe interaction of a variety of
national systems of finance - for example, the early financialisation of the US
encouraged banks in Europe to pursue strategies based on trading in
international financial markets in place of patient lending to domestic
business, wbicb in turn enabled tbe expansion of Irisb property lending.
Tbe Irisb case also sbows tbe importance of market liberalism as a force
promoting financialisation of tbe economy. In Ireland, tbis bad tbree major
dimensions. Tbe first dimension was tbe institutional power of capital
markets, as legal, institutional and taxation cbanges made private capital tbe
primary arbiter of investment in tbe economy and sidelined the public
agencies and private enterprises tbat supported productive investment and
export-oriented firms.
Second, the market based financial system in Ireland (and elsewbere)
does not operate in practice only tbrougb sets of buyers, sellers and rules but
tbrougb a network of market institutions. However, wbile tbese institutions —
competitive markets, stock markets, managerial autbority, and credit rating
agencies - were crucial aspects of a liberal market system, tbey did not enforce
prudence and discipline but in practice encouraged speculation and
indiscipline.
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Finally, the third dimension consists of the various rationalities and
justifications of action that actors draw upon in making and interpreting
conditions and decisions. In a liberal market system, these rationalities rely
heavily on market talk - justifications that give a central position to the
autonomous effects of market processes. Chief among these in Ireland were
the appeal to economic fundamentals and tbe belief in tbe self-correcting
properties of markets.
Krippner (2011) documents tbat liberalising financial markets was
initially seen in the US as a political strategy that could discipline inflation
and socio-political demands. However, policymakers soon discovered that
financial deregulation and low interest rates resulted in the opposite - a
significant loosening of economic discipline. However, this unanticipated
policy failxire quickly proved attractive to policymakers. Similarly, in debates
about tbe EU capital liberalisation directive of 1988, Germany wisbed to
remove tbe possibility of capital controls even as France and the UK wished to
retain that option, at least for bargaining leverage at least (Abdelal, 2007, p.
69) Hans Tietmeyer, tbe senior German official dealing witb tbe issue,
explained the German position in terms that echoed the US policymakers'
belief in tbe market as a source of discipline: "We saw in full capital
liberalisation tbe possibility for a test of tbe stability of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism - a test by tbe markets of policy credibility. We wanted a test by
world markets, not just European markets. ... would demonstrate tbat we had
in Europe a stable fixed exchange-rate system with market-proved stability,
ratber tban artificial stability provided by controls" (quoted in Abdelal, 2007,
p. 70).
However, just as in the cases of the US and European integration,
financial markets in Ireland promoted indiscipline, rather than the discipline
that many had hoped for. The lesson of the Irish case may be tbat markets are
not tbe overarcbing disciplinary institution that keeps the other institutions
in a society "honest", but tbat tbey are simply one institution among many to
be used for various purposes, for better and worse. Tbe necessity of social and
political regulation, decisions and debate cannot be avoided witb an appeal to
tbe arbitration of markets, wbich has proven so disastrous in the crisis of
financialisation in Ireland.
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